1. Is the BRICS Development Bank a done deal?

Not necessarily. The joint statement from the BRICS leaders announcing that they “have agreed to establish the New Development Bank” sounded pretty definite, but then there seemed to be some hedging going on too. President of South Africa Jacob Zuma struck a cautious note, saying only that “…we have decided to enter formal negotiations” on the BRICS bank, while Russian officials muttered about the devil being in the details. Newspaper headlines reflected the ambiguity, with the Financial Times declaring “BRICS agree to create development bank [sic],” while on the same day, Voice of America led with the more cautious “BRICS Summit Ends Without Development Bank Deal.” Obviously, there’s still a lot of work to do and a lot can happen.

2. Do the BRICS have enough in common to sustain a shared institution?

Maybe. Maybe not. Some lack of consensus is undoubtedly behind the hedging. The BRICS encompass very different political systems — from thriving democracy in Brazil to entrenched oligarchy in Russia — and their economies are little integrated, inherently competitive, and are different in size by orders of magnitude. In 2011, China’s GDP was over $7.3 trillion, about eighteen times larger than South Africa’s economy, the smallest of the BRICS, and three times larger than Brazil’s economy, the second biggest of the BRICS. It’s also unclear to what extent the BRICS share a vision with respect to economic development, other than not being “the West.” Still, while such differences create challenges, success is not impossible. Remember, the economy of the United States dwarfed those of its allies when it created the Bretton Woods institutions in the postwar years. And there was no lack of disagreement about the postwar order among the European powers and Washington, but somehow the Bretton Woods system survived.

3. What will the new development bank focus on?

Infrastructure, it seems. The BRICS themselves have an estimated $4.5 trillion in infrastructure needs over the next five years, and coincidently, have about the same amount in foreign exchange reserves. A safe bet is that the new BRICS bank won’t be doing the governance and democratization work that is popular at the World Bank these days, such as the “open data” project to make information about international development easily accessible to anyone. It is similarly difficult to imagine that the BRICS, which are not known for their transparency, would share the World Bank’s enthusiasm for anticorruption efforts.

4. Will developing countries welcome the BRICS development bank?

Probably. China is known for extending loans and resources without conditionality around touchy subjects like governance, and if the BRICS development bank follows suit, it’s hard to imagine many countries saying no to easy money. Still, there’s likely to be some skepticism, in no small part because of China’s inevitably outsized role in the new bank and also because of the mixed reviews China gets from its global south trading partners. Across Africa, various leaders have criticized China’s export of labor to the continent, and bemoaned the onslaught of cheap Chinese manufactured goods that undercut local production. In a particularly pointed criticism, Nigeria’s central bank governor Lamido Sanusi, lambasted China as “a significant contributor to Africa’s de-industrialization and under-development.” Nevertheless, if the BRICS bank offers economic assistance, most countries are likely to be interested. Money talks, and can even produce changes of heart. Look at the turnaround in attitude of Zambian president Michael Sata, who went from making scathing comments about China in 2006 to encouraging Chinese investment in his country in 2011.

5. Will the Bank be dominated by China?

Pretty likely, given China’s relative economic weight. And that prospect is unlikely to delight the other BRICS. Some speculate that South Africa wants to host the bank and that an African seat for the bank could be one way to reduce China’s influence. But that’s wishful thinking. Even if the bank is physically located on another continent, China will hold the purse strings, and with that comes privilege. Look how the United States, nearly seventy years after the creation of the World Bank, still gets to pick the institution’s president.

6. How will the bank be capitalized?

Not clear. There is talk of each country putting in $10 billion for an out-of-the-gate capitalization of $50 billion. But $10 billion would be an enormous commitment for South Africa. Presumably the other countries — notably China — would have to lend South Africa the money to meet its share. And this gets tricky quickly. China lending South Africa money to lend to Mozambique? In any event, $50 billion doesn’t go very far in the world of global economic development. The World Bank committed $52.6 billion in “loans, grants, equity investments, and guarantees” in 2012 alone.

7. What currency will the new bank use?

Very possibly the Yuan. China will no doubt want to make loans denominated in yuans, a borrowing option it extended to other BRICS countries in 2012. It has already pushed for lending in its own currency to protect it against currency risk in Africa’s enticing but volatile emerging markets. But making the Yuan the currency of the new development bank might only deepen unease about China’s outsized role.

8. Aren’t the BRICS “doing development” already?

Yes, a lot of it, by some measures, which is surprising given the high levels of poverty that persist across the BRICS. China is the big player; in recent years, it has substantially grown its activities abroad, particularly in Africa. However, traditional metrics of development aid are difficult, if not impossible, to apply to what China is doing, and estimates of its aid vary hugely, from $1.5 billion to $25 billion. Brazil is also emerging as a more active donor, giving more than $1 billion in various forms of aid to more to sixty-five countries in 2012. Russia, too, is a re-emerging as donor. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union competed with the United States for influence by giving away wads of cash and assistance — in 1986, it gave away a whopping $26 billion. But after the country fell apart in the 1990s, Russia became a net recipient of aid. Today, it is once again a donor, distributing $514 million in Official Development Assistance in 2011 (compared with around $5.3 billion from Canada and $30.7 billion from the United States). India is just beginning to establish itself as a foreign donor. In 2012, it collected its aid programs into the Development Partnership Administration, which has a five-year coffer of some $15 billion. South Africa, meanwhile, is supposed to put an aid agency into action in 2013. How a BRICS bank would interact with these unilateral efforts is not clear.

9. Do the BRICS already invest in each other?

Not much. In 2011, only 2.5 percent of FDI from BRICS countries went to other BRICS, whereas over 40 percent of their FDI went to developed countries. Presumably, one of the purposes of a BRICS development bank is to change this, but such a change would require a considerable shift in current priorities. Meanwhile, the World Bank has recent projects of some kind or another in all the BRICS countries, such as financing for sustainable rural development in Brazil.

10. Will a new development bank pose a challenge to the World Bank?

Perhaps. It is certainly intended by its creators as an alternative to the World Bank, although it’s still a long way from meeting that challenge. Comments from BRICS leaders don’t do much to hide a sense of schadenfreude over the declining economic circumstances of the West versus the rising fortunes of their own countries, and a deepening level of frustration that the rules of the game have not changed to reflect that reality. “We still have a situation where certain parts of the world are over-represented,” declared South African finance minister Pravin Gordhan. Despite years of promises to give the global South more say in both the IMF and the World Bank, no big structural changes have happened. And stagnating aid budgets among OECD countries only create more openings for the BRICS. So if a BRICS bank does emerge as a challenge, the West has no one to blame but itself.

Despite a growing sense of urgency, the Egyptian government has not been able, or willing, to close a deal with the IMF. In fact, in the most recent round of talks, the government back-pedaled away from the set of economic reforms it put on the table last November, and now proposes more gradual steps to combat its fiscal deficit. Among the major sticking points with the IMF is Egypt’s costly and unsustainable regime of subsidies, which currently consumes close to a third of the government’s budget.

While it is widely recognized that food and fuel subsidies are expensive and inefficient, Egyptian leaders do not want to touch the political third rail of subsidy reform. Who can blame them? Seared into the memory of just about every Egyptian politician is the winter of 1977, when bread riots nearly toppled the government of Anwar Sadat. At the behest of the IMF, Sadat tried to roll back state subsidies on food staples and cooking fuel. It took the army — and the re-imposition of the subsidies — to restore order, but not before scores had died and hundreds of buildings had been sacked.

With an already tenuous situation on the streets of Cairo, Port Said, and other major cities, the Egyptian government is hardly looking to stir up more trouble for itself by rolling back the popular food and fuel subsidies that most Egyptians have taken for granted their whole lives. But Egyptian leaders also realize that without subsidy reform, the country’s fiscal situation is untenable. Sooner or later, serious subsidy reform is inevitable. However, the Morsy government, like the military-led government before it, continues to kick the can down the road. Word has it that it’s waiting until a new parliament is elected before tackling the subsidy behemoth.

Inconveniently, the date of the parliamentary election keeps getting postponed, and without some large cash infusion — which doesn’t appear forthcoming from either the IMF or Qatar, which has already given billions — Egypt’s coffers will run dry in just a few months.

Egypt is certainly not alone in its addiction to subsidies. Many rich and poor countries are likewise guilty of adopting subsidies that rarely meet their intended purpose but soon become politically entrenched. OECD countries spend more than $250 billion a year subsidizing agriculture, yet most of that goes to big agribusinesses rather than the revered family farmer. The International Energy Agency estimates that global energy subsidies amount to more than $500 billion. As in Egypt, the benefit of most energy subsidies is skewed not to the poor, but to businesses and middle class car owners, encouraging inefficiency and environmental issues. It is no surprise that Saudi Arabia, which spends some $43 billion per year to keep domestic fuel prices low, is the world’s largest per capita consumer of oil. The steep rise of domestic consumption in the Kingdom due to subsidies has some analysts predicting that Saudi Arabia could become a net importer of oil by 2030.

In practice, subsidies create more problems than they solve by distorting the market in myriad ways, from encouraging wasteful consumption and corruption to depressing local production. In Egypt, decades of subsidized bread and other foodstuffs have discouraged domestic investment in the agricultural sector, resulting in lower local production. Corruption in the system is also rampant, with a thriving domestic black market and widespread smuggling of subsidized gasoline out of the country for resale at higher prices.

None of this makes eliminating subsidies any easier. But while the path to reform is littered with failed attempts and riots, some governments have succeeded in weaning off subsidies, and there are lessons to be gleaned from their experiences.

First, it is critical to communicate the importance and purpose of reform. Governments must take time to explain to their major stakeholders — citizens, business groups, labor unions, and others — the need for the painful adjustments and the benefits that will accrue from the changes. As a way of buttering up public opinion, Ghana preceded its 2005 fuel subsidy reduction by commissioning an independent study that demonstrated how society’s richest benefited the most from subsidies. It also emphasized through billboards and radio spots how the poor would be compensated in other ways, such as raising the daily minimum wage and eliminating schools fees. Through these measures, it was able to avoid the large street protests that had undermined earlier reform efforts.

Iran, too, laid the groundwork for its 2010 subsidy reform through an extensive public relations campaign. The government explained its goal was not to eliminate subsidies for the poor, but to move from a grossly inefficient system based on products (cheap energy) to one based on households (through cash transfers). For months prior to the reform, the government printed electricity bills showing the true cost versus the subsidized rates households and businesses were paying as another way to educate the public.

In Egypt’s case, the government needs to launch a concerted public relations campaign that exposes the wastefulness and corruption in the current subsidy system, and that also explains the potential in reallocating funds to more productive investments and targeted assistance to the poor. Cleaner air and less clogged streets should also have some appeal for urban elites.

Second, governments must present a comprehensive reform program that matches concrete benefits with subsidy reductions. Iran, for example, deposited cash compensation into household bank accounts in the weeks leading up to its subsidy reductions. Although these deposits were frozen until the day of the price increases, people were reassured knowing the money was actually there. According to an IMF assessment of Iran’s subsidy reform program, in the first 12 months of the program the government replaced some $50-60 billion in energy subsidies with $30 billion in cash transfers to households and another $15 billion in support to industries to help them make investments in greater energy efficiency.

In contrast, Nigeria hiked fuel prices in January 2012, with only vague promises to channel the savings into future infrastructure spending in return. Given the government’s sorry track record in meeting its commitments, the public was duly skeptical. Not surprisingly, widespread strikes and riots occurred, forcing the government to back down.

India, which spends north of $40 billion a year on food and energy subsidies, is heading down the path of transformational reform by replacing its bloated and corrupt subsidy system with direct cash transfers to the poor. Its challenge is one of execution. It first has to ramp up its rural banking network to make cash transfers on such a scale feasible — a gargantuan task in a country of 1.2 billion people. Regional tests are off to a bumpy start, with beneficiaries complaining that cash transfers have not been delivered as promised.

In undertaking any major subsidy reform, Egypt faces its own credibility gap with citizens. Subsidy reform has been talked about on and off for years, with various plans presented but never implemented. Just in the past two years, several half-hearted initiatives have been put forward only to be ignored. In the face of such uncertainty, hoarding has spread, contributing to fuel shortages across the country. This makes clear and honest communication all the more important.

The way forward for Egypt is not rocket science: An effective subsidy reform program should focus first on the most costly and inefficient fuel subsidies, and then phase in other reductions in a systematic way. It should couple subsidy cuts with targeted cash transfers to poor households and transitional support for energy-intensive industries like glass and cement that will be most affected. Reform certainly won’t be easy, but given that it’s inevitable, a well-planned process is preferable to the alternative.

An extensive report from Intel and Dalberg Global Development Advisors, “Women and the Web,” quantifies the Internet gender gap, explains some factors contributing to it, and proposes ways to tackle it. The report estimates “that 21 percent of women and girls in developing countries have access to the Internet, while 27 percent of men have access. This represents 600 million women and girls online—200 million fewer than men and boys.” Because of the spread of the Internet, an additional 450 million women and girls will likely become connected in the next few years, but the report’s authors believe that with the right interventions, an additional 150 million women could get connected.

One of the report’s most valuable contributions is its work on the non-technological factors preventing women from using the Internet. In much of the developing world, basic access to the Internet is a significant problem—which is why developments like undersea cables and less expensive smartphones are particularly exciting. However, social factors that stop women from using technology at the same rate as men are an additional barrier. For example, the report features a survey of women in Uganda, Egypt, India, and Mexico. In response to the question, “Why do you not currently use the Internet (more often)?” the top four responses were:
1.“I’m not interested in it” (25 percent)
2.“I’m not familiar/comfortable with the technology” (23 percent)
3.“I don’t need to access the Internet” (23 percent)
4.“I don’t have easy access to a computer/mobile phone with the Internet” (22 percent)

Indeed, lack of information about the Internet’s potential is a limiting factor for many women.

When it comes to Internet access, women’s behaviors (and in many cases, attitudes) are shaped by their families and spouses. The report notes that family-based opposition to women’s internet use includes concerns about Internet use taking time away from family responsibilities, safety (e.g. the risk of encountering a predatory person), explicit content, safety concerns around spending time in cybercafés, and a greater emphasis on helping sons learn computers if resources are scarce.

The report rightly notes that some safety concerns are entirely valid–and indeed, recommendations for increasing women’s access include addressing the “scarcity of local content tailored to women’s interests and concerns”–but of course, other concerns are also steeped in perceptions of gender ability. The story of Gayatri Buragohain, who started a group in India called the Feminist Approach to Technology, is particularly compelling: although she had an engineering degree, her family gave her husband more access to the computer because they feared that if she used it, computer problems would somehow develop. “Fear [of technology] is instilled in girls,” she says.

The report offers a variety of solutions to get more women online, ranging from Internet cafes exclusively for women to “invest[ing] in bringing technology and long-term training to the hardest to reach populations, such as low-income and rural women.” Continuing to measure women’s access and to research the reasons for these barriers are other important goals. This report and work by the Cherie Blair Foundation have already made a powerful contribution. But implementing these kinds of solutions will take coordinated efforts.

One organization taking up an important piece of this task is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID just released its annual letter as well as the first-ever USAID Forward progress report, which chronicles the organization’s reform efforts. Both assess progress on closing the gender gap in mobile technology.

The letter mentions a private-public mobile partnership in Iraq, where just 20 percent of women had mobile phones as of 2011. A USAID partnership with the carrier Asiacell resulted in an additional 1.8 million-plus women signing up, and women are now almost 40 percent of Asiacell’s customers. In a blog post, USAID Chief Innovation Officer Maura O’Neill describes some of Asiacell’s innovations that made this possible, including “the freedom to choose off-peak hours, a free service to block any number from calling or texting, and discounts on female-focused value added services.”

Another project discussed in the annual progress report exemplifies what Internet/mobile connectivity means for women’s health. The report notes success by the USAID-supported Mayer Hashi Project in tackling the vital issue of postpartum hemorrhage, which causes more maternal deaths in Bangladesh than any other cause. The USAID report mentions plans to expand the project by involving more women through social media, mobile phones, and videos.

Despite progress for women with the Internet, it is important to note that scaling up promising mobile-based solutions remains a major challenge and will take years of consistent effort.

Is time quickly running out on the House of Saud, or will the kingdom somehow manage to muddle through? The answer to that question lies in large part with the next generation. Sixty-four percent of Saudi Arabia’s nearly twenty million people are under the age of thirty; the largest youth cohort includes those who are currently only twelve to sixteen years old. Saudi youth are avid Internet and social media users (YouTube use in Saudi Arabia rose 260 percent in 2012, versus an average of 50 percent growth internationally), and are more connected to the outside world than ever before. Moreover, an unprecedented number of Saudi students – some 145,000—are currently studying abroad in thirty countries around the world, nearly half of them in the United States. How will this younger generation shape the future of their country?

A fascinating new study by Caryle Murphy, a veteran Middle East journalist who was once the Washington Post’s bureau chief in Cairo, explores the hopes and aspirations of Saudi youth today. Murphy, who lived in and reported from Saudi Arabia between 2008 and 2011, conducted in-depth interviews with eighty-three twentysomething year-old Saudis. Representing a broad cross-section of society and geographic diversity across the country, the interviewees candidly discuss with Murphy their views on religion and politics, the always touchy subject of gender relations, their career hopes, and “how they see their country evolving in the next decade.”

One thing that comes across clearly in the interviews is a growing impatience with the status quo. Connectivity to the rest of the world is encouraging critical thinking, and leading to doubts among Saudi youth. As one interviewee puts it, “everyone is questioning everything.” Another says that “Twitter is our parliament now,” referring to the remarkable debates happening through that forum. In ever increasing numbers, Saudi youth are using Twitter to “vent discontent and anger, as well as discuss once-taboo topics such as princely extravagances, judicial misbehavior and the lack of political rights.”

It’s not at all clear, however, that discontent on social media will translate into political activism. Indeed, there seems to be a large segment of the youth population that is decidedly uninterested in politics. “These youth are content with how things are now, as long as the state continues to dispense financial benefits and promote an Islamic national identity.” Some are against elections, “believing they would lead to incompetent leadership, civil strife or worse.” There are, however, politically conscious youth “who deeply resent their lack of political and civil rights and would like a say in how they are governed.” These include activists with an Islamist perspective, as well as liberal Muslims. Murphy stresses that Saudi youth “are by no means a revolutionary lot, preferring gradual, step-by-step change.” For now, she writes, “and probably for a few more years, the Saudi government does not face a generation of angry, rebellious twentysomethings.”

The big question, of course, is whether and when that will change. Money is a big factor. As long as the state has the resources to provide the good life, political apathy will likely persist. “Money speaks,” observes one interviewee. How the transitions in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt progress will be another factor. If young Saudis see stable, prosperous, and more open societies emerging around them, they are more likely to push for change. But if chaos reigns, well, all bets are off.

There are many other interesting insights from the interviews. On religion, “access to different interpretations of Islam through new media also is encouraging independent thinking.” Many young Saudis, particularly women, are increasingly questioning religiously justified restrictions on their personal freedoms, whether enforced dress codes, gender segregation, guardianship rules for women, and the ban on women driving. Tolerance among young Saudis seems to be growing, with the glaring exception of views toward Shia where there is still “unabashed hostility.”

Murphy’s conclusion is that Saudi youth “do not want to overthrow the House of Saud.” They want their country to remain firmly committed to Islam, but they “favor a religious practice that is both more voluntary and more respectful of differences among Muslims.” They want to be governed more by laws and less by religion. They want less corruption and more “transparency and meritocracy in the work arena.” Easier said than done. The monarchy’s current slow pace of incremental change is unlikely to meet the aspirations of this young generation, which makes me think that even if Saudi youth are a decidedly unrevolutionary lot, the country is still in for a bumpy ride.

Let’s face it: a visionary reformer was never likely to emerge from the conclave. After all, the majority of voting cardinals (and realistic candidates) was put in place by the conservative Pope Benedict–a reward for toeing the party line. Needless to say, Cardinal Bergoglio’s conservative credentials are more than intact: stridently anti-abortion, he has gone head to head with Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, over gay marriage and the free distribution of birth control.

Indeed, on many substantive issues, he seems cut from the same cloth as his conservative predecessor: ordaining women? No way. Liberation theology? A scourge. Moreover, Bergoglio has faced swirling allegations of condoning, if not complicity with, Argentina’s brutal military dictatorship that in the 1970s “disappeared” some 30,000 opponents, allegations he has vigorously denied but that still dog him. Some Argentinians continue to complain that he did not speak out forcefully enough against the violence and tyranny of the military regime and that when he became Archbishop of Buenos Aires (1998) and then cardinal (2001), he did not do enough to examine the church’s role in the conflict. In several interviews over the years, he has defended his behavior, citing his efforts to help protect various people at risk. Given that he supposedly came in second to Cardinal Ratzinger in the 2005 conclave, the Vatican has had ample time to consider, and dismiss, these criticisms.

Despite being another conservative septuagenarian, Cardinal Bergoglio is in some ways an exciting choice for the papacy. The first person from the Americas to gain the post, Bergoglio’s selection in part reflects the fact that the majority of Catholics now hail from the global south. Central and South America are home to some 40 percent of the world’s Catholics, and from Mexico to Chile there is tremendous enthusiasm and hope that Pope Francis represents an opportunity for that part of the world to exert more influence in Rome. “It seems that my brother cardinals went almost to the end of the world [to pick me],” Bergoglio noted wryly after being chosen.

Perhaps most importantly, Bergoglio is also the first Jesuit to become pope. Founded in 1540 by Ignatius of Loyola, the Society of Jesus is a Catholic order associated for centuries with intellectualism, education and the founding of schools (think Georgetown), ministry to the sick and poor, and an emphasis on social justice. Following a religious epiphany, St. Ignatius vowed to renounce his comfortable existence and dedicate himself to a life of good works modeled after the 12th-century spiritual leader St. Francis of Assisi, among others. Cardinal Bergoglio is the first to choose Francis as his papal name, and by all accounts, he strives to lead a humble life. Much has been made of the fact that he sold the archbishop’s elegant residence in Buenos Aires, opting instead to live in a small apartment and take the bus to work. He seems to walk the talk of humility.

Whether Pope Francis is up to the daunting challenges confronting the Catholic Church today remains to be seen. The scandals have shaken the faith of many, but the fact remains that around the world, the Catholic Church plays a vital on-the-ground role in places where few others are willing to serve. Many Catholic nuns, priests, and other affiliates are not only faith leaders, but also aid workers on the front lines of some of the harshest conditions, making deep sacrifices to serve the poorest of the poor. Pope Francis is long known for speaking out on behalf of those who have least. At a time of growing inequality, he has an important role to play.

Last year, Haleh Esfandiari, the program’s director, asked a diverse group of women from business, politics, the media, and civil society to assess how women have fared in the wake of the Arab uprisings. This year, the question got straight to the point: what are the challenges to women’s security in the MENA region?

The forty responses from Indonesia to Morocco catalog a host of concerns: eroding legal rights for women, economic vulnerability, rises in trafficking, and prostitution out of desperation. They also speak to a worrisome uptick in targeted violence against women–violence intended to scare women out of public spaces, out of politics, and back into the home. Over a third of the respondents named rape specifically as either a tool of war or intimidation, and another third denounced the rising number of mass sexual assault on women. In the words of Yassmine El Sayed Hani of the Egyptian paper, Al Akbar, these public attacks are meant “to deter” opponents of the regime–both men and women–from mobilizing.

Yet women are mobilizing. Refusing to be intimidated and deterred, activists–male and female–are forming groups to expose injustice, harness national and international outrage, claw back public space for women, and to fight for reforms.

Many of the respondents also emphasized the need to recognize that Syrian women, in particular, are living in the midst of a brutal war. Honey Al Sayed of Syria writes that displaced women, many of whom have lost their male relatives, are left as the sole breadwinners without physical shelter or social networks, and “need to be recognized and mentored within their society and the international community.”

This overriding call to recognize the impact of war and political instability on women runs through the responses. Wajeeha Al Baharna, a women’s rights activist in Bahrain, writes, “We find that women in wars and conflicts are the first to be affected, and during times of prosperity and development, they are the last to benefit.” Safia Taleb Al Souhail, a member of parliament in Iraq, laments the utter lack of commitment by the country’s leaders to promote gender equality in the context of security reform. She goes on to say, “The increase of women’s seats in parliaments alone, despite all of its importance, is not sufficient in an emerging democracy. Women must be seen in the society as ruling and leading actors…” Democracy is more than elections, and women’s security is a prerequisite. This is a particularly salient lesson for women’s rights activists in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.

Many also point to the rising challenge of political Islam to women’s legal rights and equal citizenship. Especially in Saudi Arabia, women face glaring obstacles to their full participation in public life. A doctoral candidate in health services research, Hala Al Dosari, puts it simply, “Segregation is a potential barrier to the meaningful engagement of women in shared decision making.”

Dr. Esfandiari writes in her introduction that the countries of North Africa should look to Iran as a warning of what happens when women’s rights are defined under Islamic law. She says it “has meant the institutionalization of unequal status.” Fatima Sbaity Kassem, former director of the UN-ESCWA Center for Women in Lebanon, concurs saying, “With uncertainties looming large, I wonder whether public Islam will ever lead to Arab democratization as public Christianity did for the West; and while celebrating 2013 International Women’s Day, will an Arab women’s spring ever dawn?”

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The good news is that women—and men—are saying “enough.” Concerned activists have formed new groups like Tahrir Bodyguard, Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment/Assault (OpAntiSH), and At3 Eidak (literally, “cut your hand” and figuratively, “don’t you dare”) to protect women and, more broadly, shine a spotlight on the harassment of women in general. Many of the activists involved believe that the attacks are organized with the intent to terrorize women and deter them from participating in the political sphere.

The activist groups have helped muster national and international outrage. For the first time, victims of sexual assaults have appeared on television to speak publicly about their horrific experiences; all of the major political groups have been compelled to comment, and U.S. officials have recently reiterated that women’s rights must be prioritized in the ongoing transition.

Still, politically motivated violence against women has probably not crested. Members of the Shura Council, Egypt’s upper house of parliament, have made statements that women who protest in Tahrir cannot expect the government to protect them, and some have called for separate areas for women to gather at protests. Another preacher said that women who go to Tahrir to protest have no shame and want to be raped. At stake in the battle against sexual violence is not just a woman’s personal safety and dignity, but also her right to move in public space and participate in the ongoing political transition.